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Growth, Consumption and Political Stability in China 
Fernando Alexandre




A highly successful investment- and export-led growth strategy has positioned China as the 
second largest economy and as the largest exporter in the world. Households’ consumption 
has played a minor role in its growth strategy, which is reflected in its unique and very high 
saving rates. In this paper we argue that the low weight of consumption in total expenditure is 
the result of the pervasiveness of the state in the economy, which aimed at impairing the 
growth  of  middle  classes  and,  therefore,  at  preserving  political  stability.  Nonetheless,  an 
increase  in  purchasing  power  and  the  cultural  individualisation  of  vast  portions  of  the 
population is leading to an increase in popular mobilisation and social unrest. This indicates 
that,  contrary  to  common  pessimist  analyses,  prospects  for  democratization  are  perhaps 
stronger than usually presumed.   
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1. Introduction 
The rise of China was one of the most important changes in the global economy since the 
Second World War (Ferguson, 2009).  In  2010  China’s  was  the third  or  the  second  largest 
economy in the world, depending on the measure used to evaluate its share in total world 
output, and it was the world’s largest exporter. The astonishing economic performance of 
China, since the end of the 1970s, was the result of an investment-led strategy, of openness to 
international trade and of the introduction and development of market institutions. 
Although the extraordinary economic performance in the last three decades provides support 
to the growth-strategy followed by the Chinese State, several authors have questioned the 
sustainability of this model – see, for example, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2006), Prasad (2009) 
and  Rajan  (2010).  These  critics  have  been  emphasising  the  need  and  the  benefits  of 
rebalancing China’s sources of economic growth, namely, the need to increase the weight of 
consumption in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in order to guarantee a stronger growth in the 
future,  gains  in  job  creation,  a more equal  income  distribution,  and a  reduction  in  global 
economic imbalances.  
Since 2004 China’s leaders have mentioned the need to change the country’s growth strategy, 
namely, the necessity of rebalancing the sources of economic growth (Lardy, 2007). In fact, 
both  the  12
th  Five-Year  Plan  and  the  previous  one  aimed  at  increasing  the  share  of 
consumption  in  GDP.  However,  as  noticed  by  Qi  and  Prime  (2009)  private  consumption 
expenditures were not positively affected by reforms and Roubini (2011) mentioned that the 
12
th Plan still relies on investment as the driving force of growth. In fact, an appraisal of the 
various  components  of  China’s  GDP  growth  suggests  that  despite  government  rhetoric  to 
expand the domestic market, private consumption is not prioritized. 
In this paper, we argue that the low weight of consumption in total expenditure that has 
resulted from the State’s growth strategy, aimed at impairing the growth of middle classes and 
at preserving political stability. However, given the limits of an ever increasing investment 
strategy, China will have most likely to increase the weight of consumption in GDP in order to 
keep the growth pace of the recent decades. Such a change in the growth strategy of China 
might  have  a  significant  impact  on  political  stability.  Therefore,  this  paper  discusses  the 
potential effects of an increase in the weight of consumption on political stability through its 
impact on the development of middle classes.    3 
 
Section two will contemplate China’s rise to great power status. Section three will highlight 
how this rise is predicated on savings and government allocated investments rather than on 
household consumption. Section four examines the role of the middle classes and prospects 
for  democratization,  with  the  investment-led  economic  strategy  in  mind.  Section  five 
concludes.      
 
2.  Growth: A rising world superpower 
 
The rise of China as a world superpower is probably the most conspicuous economic and 
political event of the last two decades. Between 1978 and 2010 the average GDP growth rate 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was approximately 10%, rising at a rate higher than 
10% in sixteen years and reaching a maximum of 15.2% in 1984. However, as can be gleaned 
from the analysis of Figure 1, the GDP growth rate was quite uneven throughout the period. 
The lowest GDP growth rates were attained in 1989 and 1990, 4.1% and 3.8%, respectively, 
down from 11.3% in 1988 – those years were marked by political instability, namely, the 
Tiananmen riots and massacre. In 1991, the growth rate accelerated to 9.2% and in the next 
two years the GDP growth rate was above 14%. In 1994 the growth rate decelerated and was 
always below 10% between 1997and 2002, averaging 8.3% and with a minimum of 7.6% in 
1999.  From  that  value  the  growth  rate  increased  steadily  to  13%  in  2007.  Despite  the 
importance of  international  trade to  the  PRC’  s  economy,  the  impact of the  international 
financial  crisis  was  only  to  reduce  the  growth  rate  to  9%  and  8.4%  in  2008  and  2009, 
respectively. The very high GDP growth rates translated into an average increase in per capita 
GDP growth of more than 7% per annum, in the last two decades. 
 
  
             Figure 1. Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2010) 




























The  economic  performance  of  the  PRC  has  positioned  China  as  one  of  the  three  largest 
economic areas in the world, alongside the European Union (EU) and United States of America 
(USA). Economic growth is the basis for the emergence of the PRC as an international great 
power.  Between  1980  and  2008  its  share  of  total  world  output,  as  defined  in  Angus 
Maddison’s database, increased from 5% to 17%, approximately the same share of Western 
Europe and close to the 20% share of the USA economy, which during the 1990s became the 
most important economic area in the world – see Figure 2.
1 According to several forecasts, 
China will become in the near future the largest economy in the world. For example, according 
to the forecast of the Nobel Prize in Economics Robert Fogel, by 2040, China will produce 40% 
of the world GDP whereas USA and the European Union will account for 14% and 5% of the 
total world output, respectively (Fogel, 2010). Albert Keidel from Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace predicts that China’s economic size will equal the USA by 2035 and double 
it by 2050 (Keidel, 2008). All these economic growth projections point to the global economic 
preeminence of China in a very near future.     
  
 
       Figure 2. Source: Maddison (2010) 
   
                                                           
1 Using nominal exchange rates the share of China in world output would be approximately 11% and it 
would  be  thethird  largest  economy  far  behind  the  European  Union  and  the  United  States  of 
America.However,  has  discussed  below,  there  is  evidence  that  the  Renminbi  has  been  significantly 
undervalued, at least in the last two decades, thus it is favourable to use adjusted measures of exchange 
rates such as Purchasing Power Parities. 
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The international financial crisis seems to have reinforced the role of China in global politics, 
that is, as a world superpower.
2 In fact, in the G20 meetings that followed the financial crisis, 
looking  for  cooperative  solutions  in  the  regulation  of  financial  markets  and  measures  to 
accelerate the economic recovery, China and the USA have led works and discussions in many 
circumstances giving rise to the term G2. But, even though China is becoming progressively 
assertive in the international sphere, it still attempts, in a Deng Xiaoping fashion, to downplay 
its real capabilities, and does not feel comfortable with the G2, as it does not intend to publicly 
acknowledge parity of power with the USA. 
The Chinese leadership, and scholarly community (Xia, 2001), seems to acknowledge that their 
country’s rise to great power status depends on the maintenance of economic growth and on 
the continuing amplification of interdependence. After an official trip to the USA in 2002, 
Zheng Bijian, a senior official and director of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-affiliated 
China Reform Forum, began to propagate the notion of China’s “peaceful rise”. He realised 
that perceptions in the West on China’s emergence were polarized, at one extreme, around 
the idea that the global power transition represents a major threat to USA security, and at the 
other,  around  the  expectation  that  China  will  inevitably  collapse  due  to  internal  socio-
economic contradictions. 
Both hypotheses, of threat and collapse, work against a stable ascension. Therefore “peaceful 
rise” was proposed as a publicity slogan to assuage international fears and attempt to convince 
foreign audiences that economic development is the prime national interest, and will supplant 
policies that hinder the construction of a stable foreign and domestic environment conducive 
to  growth.  The  domestic  dimension  of  “peaceful  rise”  involves  rebalancing  the  country’s 
growth model. In 2003, during a speech at Harvard University, Wen Jiabao (quoted in Glaser & 
Medeiros, 2007:298) claimed that expanding the domestic market and converting huge citizen 
savings into investments were essential aspects of China’s peaceful rise. Although the term 
‘rise’ was subsequently replaced by ‘development’, in an attempt to erase the threatening 
connotations of rise, the core policy priorities underlying the slogan remain. And so seems to 
remain the mitigated role of the domestic market in China’s growth strategy, which we discuss 
in the next section.  
                                                           
2 The economic performance of China during the international financial crisis seems to corroborate the 
decoupling hypothesis, according to which emerging economies are less sensitive to the business cycle 




3.  A successful and unique growth strategy: investment not consumption 
 
In Figure 3, we present data on the contributions to real GDP growth of private consumption, 
investment, government consumption and net exports in the 1980s, in the 1990s and in the 
period  2001-2005.  The  most  striking  feature  of  these  data  is  the  steady  increase  in  the 
contribution of investment expenditures to real GDP growth, increasing from approximately 
25% in the 1980s to more than 50% in the period 2001-2005. In fact, investment in fixed 
capital formation, that is, new factories, infrastructures and housing, has been the main driver 
of economic growth since the end of the 1980s. This role of investment was reinforced during 
the international financial crisis in order to compensate for the decrease in exports.   
 
 
   Figure 3. Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2006)   
 
Although a strong capital accumulation or an investment-led growth strategy has characterized 
other  East  Asian  countries,  such  as  Japan,  Korea  and  Malaysia,  similar  values  for  the 
investment rate (the ratio between investment and GDP) have occurred for very short periods. 
The very high investment rates of China make it singular in the history of economic growth: 
throughout the period 1978-2008 the average investment rate was approximately 33%, rising 
to more than 40% in the period 2004-2008 and reaching 43% in 2006 – see Figure 4.  
       



















            Figure 4. Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2010)       
 
The expansion of the domestic market, aiming at rebalancing the country’s long-term growth 
model, is allegedly one of the key objectives of ongoing reforms and of the 11
th and 12
th Five-
Year Plans. However, the plummeting net contribution of private consumption to real GDP and 
the  prioritization  of  fixed  capital  formation  over  household  consumption  can  be  taken  as 
evidence  that  so  far  the  government  has  not  abandoned  its  investment-  and  export-led 
strategy.    
 
The high investment rates have been financed by very high domestic savings by households, 
firms and the Government. In Figure 5 we show net national savings as a percentage of gross 
national income (GNI) for China, India, USA and Germany, since the beginning of the 1980s. 
Domestic savings in China have been very high when compared to developed countries like the 
USA (which is known for its very low saving rates) or Germany, but also when compared to 
countries of similar development such as India. Additionally, the saving rate has increased 
from 21% in 1982 to 44% in 2008. The increase in the saving rate was very strong since 2000, 
when it was 27%.      
 
 

























































  Figure 5. Source: World Bank (2010) 
 
Several authors have been investigating the factors behind the very high saving rates in China’s 
economy. According to Modigliani and Cao (2004) the absence of a national public pension 
system  is  an  important  determinant  of  the  high  saving  rates.  Chamon  and  Prasad  (2008) 
analyze  the  factors  behind  the  rising  saving  rates  of  urban  households  and  conclude  that 
precautionary motives in face of rising health care and education expenditures are the main 
explanation (see also Qi and Prime, 2009). These authors also suggest that the transition to a 
market economy has increased uncertainty, which might have had a positive effect on saving. 
Finally, Chamon and Prasad (2008) emphasise the role of the underdevelopment of financial 
markets and the limits it imposes on households borrowing, namely to buy durable goods and 
housing.  Therefore,  to  circumvent  borrowing  constraints  households  have  to  save.  These 
analyses of the causes of high saving rates in China suggest that a shift in its rising trend 
requires  an  increase  in  social  expenditures  by  the  government,  namely  on  health  care, 
education and pensions, and more developed and deeper financial markets. 
 
The  other  side  of  the  saving  rates  equation  is  private  consumption  behaviour.  Despite 
advances toward a market economy and the recent declarations of China’s leaders defending 
on several occasions the strengthening of domestic consumption (e.g. Lardy, 2007), the weight 
of  consumption  in  GDP  has  steadily  decreased  since  the  beginning  of  the  1980s,  when  it 
represented approximately 55% of total expenditure. In the period 2001-2005 it averaged only 
slightly more than 40%. According to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
rate  continues  to  drop.  In  2008  consumption  accounted  for  only  37%.  This  share  of 
consumption  in  GDP  is  very  low  when  compared  to  developed  countries  and  also  when 
compared to countries of similar development levels as India. For example, in 2005, household 
consumption in USA, United Kingdom and Japan accounted for 70, 60 and 57 percent of GDP, 
respectively. In India the weight of household consumption in GDP, in 2005, was 61 percent, 
even though its GDP per capita was less than half of China’s. 
   9 
 
 
         Figure 6. Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2006) 
 
Figure 6 shows that government consumption as a share of GDP has been fairly stable and is 
also very low, compared to other major economies in the world, averaging around 14 percent 
of GDP throughout the period. Between 2001 and 2005, the growth of net exports of goods 
and services has also been a major source of economic growth, increasing from 1.7% of GDP in 
2004 to more than 4.6% of GDP in 2005. In 2006, net exports represented 6.7% of GDP and 
approximately a fifth of China’s growth (Lardy, 2007). While investments and trade blossom, in 
relative terms consumption dwindles.  
 
All these measures would contribute to the development of middle classes. Although they are 
becoming more populous and richer, when the pace of overall growth of the Chinese economy 
is taken into consideration, it seems middle classes have not been the primary beneficiaries of 
economic reforms.  In fact, it seems that the government’s growth strategy has been indirectly 
constraining  the  power  of  the  middle  classes.  The  1989  and  1990  slumps  in  GDP  growth 
revealed to senior decision makers the great threat that political stability represents to China’s 
rise. Given the role middle classes play in provoking unrest and demanding regime change, for 
example in Hong Kong, China’s investment-led growth strategy might also be understood as a 
mechanism to reduce middle class consumption and power, and to maintain political stability.  
 
4.  Middle classes and the quest for democracy 
According to a Euromonitor report (Hodgson, 2007) widely publicised by Chinese media, in 
2007 China’s middle class included 80 million people. But this sum is estimated to reach 700 
million, or half of China’s forecasted population, by 2020. Even if the estimation turns out not 
to be correct – among other factors, that estimation will depend on the government’s decision 
to effectively rebalance the country’s long-term growth model -, China’s intermediary social 

















stratum is bound to widen. This has implications for political stability, but scholars do not 
agree on what those may be. Conventionally, two widely encompassing approaches to the 
correlation between middle class growth and political stability prevail (Tomba, 2009a:2). On 
the one hand, optimists believe the intrinsic and structural characteristics of middle classes 
lead them to value positively political choice and democracy. On the other, pessimists argue 
that, on the contrary, middle classes bring stability and prevent regime change. In any case, it 
is necessary to ask who the middle classes are.    
Yang (2010) contends that the Chinese middle class does not yet have a cohesive identity or 
class culture. There are internal divisions and three main groups can be identified. The new 
middle class is comprised of party officials, entrepreneurs and senior-level bureaucrats and 
technocrats. The traditionally self-employed form the old middle class. The marginal middle 
class includes the majority of urbanites that have recently experienced upward social mobility 
and work in the commercial or service sectors. Yang stresses how the middle class as a whole 
tends to have high expectations in terms of social  justice and a fairly positive attitude to 
democracy. However, it is not possible to make this attribution to all segments of the middle 
class.     
  
        Figure 7. Source: McKinsey
3 Global Institute (2006) 
Many authors (for example, Wright, 2010) stress the fact that most sectors of society in China 
have benefited from the country’s massive creation of wealth. From this viewpoint, the better-
                                                           
3 The McKinsey Global Institute (2006) definition of economic classes in China groups urban households 
into five annual income ranges: Poor, less than 25 000 renminbi; Lower aspirants, 25 000 to 40 000 
renminbi; Upper aspirants, 40 000 to 100 000; Affluent, 100 000 to 200 000; and Global, greater than 
200 000 renminbi. Middle class refers to lower and upper aspirants, that is, households earning between 
25 000 and 100 000 renminbi per year (this is equivalent to a household annual income between $13 
500 and $53 900, using purchasing power parity exchange rates). 















off are happy with what they have gained and the middle classes are waiting for their ‘slice of 
the cake’. Governments can legitimize their rule and maintain political stability by means of 
performance or by mass persuasion, and usually a combination of both (Brady, 2009, 434). To 
put it in Bakken’s terms (quoted in Tomba, 2009b), the legitimacy of the post-Mao Communist 
Party lies in its simultaneous effort to develop material civilization and spiritual civilization, or 
social control. China’s economic performance is a major source of legitimacy and attraction 
both domestically and internationally. The government realizes this and strives to maintain 
growth.  In  fact  the  ancient  ‘mandate  of  heaven’  doctrine,  which  has  been  invoked  for 
centuries in China to correlate legitimacy with performance (Glanville, 2010), has recently 
appeared in various forms in official governmental discourse.  
However, wealth has been unequally distributed. Figure 7 shows that disposable income is still 
concentrated in the hands of the lower middle class and the poor, but this is shifting rapidly as 
the aspiring middle classes hoard wealth changing their class status into affluent. They have 
clear economic incentives to demand change. Despite a comparatively high level of political 
stability, social unrest is on the high. The number of “public order disturbances” increased by 
nearly 50% between 2003 and 2005, from 58,000 occurrences to 87,000 (Lum, 2006). Although 
it is hard to infer what these numbers actually mean, due to methodological uncertainties in 
Chinese statistics-making, they do highlight a significant degree of social tension in China. The 
government is very cautious of any potential triggers of social unrest and public mobilization, 
and has blocked access to information on the internet regarding the Jasmin revolution and 
other revolts in Maghreb. After anonymous calls for mass protest were made on networking 
sites  and  social  media,  security  forces  were  amassed  in  locations  of  suspected  public 
gatherings in various cities (New York Times, February 20
th 2011). 
Scholars of China’s social structure are offering mixed pictures. Li (2010) argues consumption 
of real estate is a major sociological phenomenon in China. The current middle-class fever for 
home ownership in gated communities, or “private paradises”, on the one hand results in a 
trend towards privatized living and collective or political apathy. On the other hand, it has 
triggered  public  activism  against  encroaching  developers.  Kuah-Pearce  &  Guiheux  (2009) 
emphasize  that  social  claims  are  becoming  increasingly  institutionalized  and  political 
mobilization gradually more organized. However, the institutionalized activities of lawyers and 
Non-Governmental  Organizations  (NGOs)  can  both challenge  the  current  regime and  offer 
means for the middle classes to vent off frustration, increasing stability. 12 
 
According to Tomba (2009b), the government intends to create subjects that are independent 
enough to choose what to consume but responsible enough not to contest the political status 
quo.  But,  private  consumption  figures  indicate  that  the  government  does  not  want  the 
domestic  market  to  expand  too much, most  probably  because  it  recognizes the  threat to 
stability inherent in middle classes. There have been numerous mass demonstrations with 
democratic strands in Hong Kong on an almost annual basis. For example, on July the 1
st 2003, 
half  a  million  people  gathered  to  protest  against  an  anti-subversion  law.  The  democratic 
movement in Hong Kong is backed primarily by the middle classes (Lin, 2006:170), giving the 
central government in Beijing one more reason to be worried about growing middle class 
power. Businessmen are also present in the Hong Kong democratic movement. Over on the 
mainland  the  entrepreneurial  class  is  assuming  increasingly  important  roles  in  the  CCP, 
although none in the top leadership. 
Hong Kong has a very significant role in the mainland as a beacon of exemplary middle class 
consumer behavior. The nouveaux riches often cross the border to spend their newly found 
wealth in Hong Kong shopping outlets. While in an intensely transnational environment, new 
social values and political ideas are encountered. Furthermore, values related to consumer 
culture are often closely related to political values. If the social structures found in Hong Kong 
are gradually exported to China, increased consumer choice may translate into an urge for 
greater political choice. The pace at which these changes will take place will depend on China’s 
government economic policy options, namely on its resolve to rebalance its growth model 
towards households consumption and social expenditures.     
5. Conclusion   
The State has channeled households’ savings to finance public investments in infrastructures 
and  private  investment,  hindering  private  consumption  and  the  development  of  middle 
classes, through the control of the bank-based financial system. This growth strategy makes 
China’s economy closer to a centralized and planned economy rather than to a decentralized 
economy.  In  China’s  economy,  high  savings  signify  a  constraint  on  consumer  choice,  with 
disposable income being transmuted into fixed capital investment instead of being spent on 
household consumption. Ultimately, wealth created by workers is allocated according to state 
priorities, in detriment of potential consumer power and choice. In this paper, we argue that 
although the astonishing performance of the Chinese economy provides support to the growth 
strategy followed so far, it may also be explained by the goal of political stability. 13 
 
In  fact,  once  the  middle  classes  have  greater  access  to  goods,  vastly  increased  consumer 
choice can lay the motivational foundations for people to want greater political choice as well. 
This  process  affects  each  individual  consumer,  gradually,  but  could  eventually  trigger  an 
orchestrated middle class claim for regime change and democratization.  
The early 2011 revolutions in North Africa demonstrated to the world that economic growth is 
not  enough  to  curb  social  unrest.  On  the  contrary,  greater  wealth,  especially  when  it  is 
unequally distributed, can strengthen dissidence. Although the central government in Beijing 
has swiftly quelled any reverberations of the African uprisings on Chinese soil, the potential for 
similar movements is realistic and increases in probability with the rise of the middle classes. 
Arguments vary as to whether the middle classes and their private consumption foster stability 
or unrest, but one incontrovertible fact is that Beijing is willing to spend as much as deemed 
necessary  to  maintain  social  equilibrium.  During  the  2011  plenary  session  of  the  National 
People’s Congress (NPC) the public administration category of wei-wen, which encompasses 
maintenance of law and order, civil surveillance and crackdown on dissent, was highlighted like 
few times before (Lam, 2011). For the first time, the wei-wen budget exceeded the official 
military budget, reaching a total of $95 billion dollar, a 13.8% increase in relation to 2010.   
The preoccupation with quelling civil unrest is dominating the 2011-2015 Five Year Plan. There 
is  little  evidence  that  political  reforms  and  the  adoption  of  Western  style  freedom  and 
democracy narratives will gain any significant weight in the near future. The swift and powerful 
People’s Armed Police reaction to calls for protests and mass agglomeration, stimulated by the 
Jasmin Revolution in North Africa, demonstrates China’s obsession with maintaining ‘social 
harmony’ and conformity at all costs. This may hinder the recently announced objective in its 
Five-Year Plan of increasing the weight of consumption on total expenditure. Therefore, it 
seems  that  the  Chinese  authorities  may  face  a  dilemma  between  high  growth  rates  and 
political stability: to attain the first objective they may be obliged to rebalance the growth 
model  towards  an  increase  in  consumption  which,  in  turn,  will  favor  the  development  of 
middle classes, which may give rise to political instability. 
    
   14 
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